



**University of
Zurich**^{UZH}

**Zurich Open Repository and
Archive**

University of Zurich
University Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch

Year: 2011

Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe: a hierarchical selection model

Bernauer, J ; Bochsler, D

Abstract: The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry (determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.07.001>

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich

ZORA URL: <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-53608>

Journal Article

Accepted Version

Originally published at:

Bernauer, J; Bochsler, D (2011). Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe: a hierarchical selection model. *Electoral Studies*, 30(4):738-755.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.07.001>

Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe: A hierarchical selection model

Julian Bernauer^{a, 1}, Daniel Bochsler^{b, 2}

- ^a Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, PB D85, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany
- ^b NCCR Democracy at the University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland
- Received 17 February 2010. Revised 5 July 2011. Accepted 7 July 2011. Available online 12 July 2011.
- <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.07.001>,

Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, September 10–12, 2009 and at the SVPW Annual Meeting, Genf, January 7–8, 2010.

Abstract

The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry (determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.

Keywords

- Ethnic minority politics;
 - Eastern Europe;
 - Niche parties;
 - Self-selection bias;
 - Multilevel modelling;
 - Electoral thresholds
-

1. Introduction

A strong body of empirical research on ethnic conflict provides a clear outlook on the consequences if ethnic minorities are not politically integrated: The political inclusion of ethnic minorities helps to contain ethnic conflict ([\[Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008\]](#), [\[Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2007\]](#), [\[Cohen, 1997\]](#) and [\[Saideman et al., 2002\]](#)). In times of peace, an impact in favour of ethnic minorities regarding legislation ([\[Preuhs, 2006\]](#)), political participation ([\[Banducci et al., 2004\]](#)) and support for the political system ([\[Norris, 2004\]](#) and [\[Pantoja and Segura, 2003\]](#)) is attributed to political representation of social minorities. Descriptive representation (through members of the own group) is a key aspect of political inclusion ([\[Mansbridge, 1999\]](#)). The abrupt introduction of political pluralism in previously autocratic systems in a number of central and eastern European countries fuelled tensions in particular along an ethnic dimension ([\[Gurr, 1993\]](#), [\[Gurr, 2000\]](#), [\[Fowkes, 2002\]](#) and [\[Evans and Whitefield, 1993\]](#)). At the same time, the young age of the democracies rules out long-term voter dissatisfaction as a powerful explanation for the success of ethnic parties ([\[Kitschelt, 1995\]](#)) and clears the way to focus on a different set of political-institutional variables. Therefore, the region is highly suitable for an analysis of the success of ethnic minority parties, defined as parties aiming at representing and mobilising voters of an ethnic minority group ([\[Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998\]](#): p. 4; [\[Chandra, 2011\]](#)). They are an important way how ethnic minority groups get represented in the political institutions.³ We define ethnicity as a common view of a group identity, based on aspects such as cultural habits, language, religion, regional belonging, or race, connotated with a common ethnic label ([\[Hale, 2008\]](#): p. 47).

Against this backdrop, the lack of comparative quantitative studies on the formation, electoral success and parliamentary representation of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe is surprising. Most existing research takes on a case-oriented design (e.g. [\[Barany, 2002\]](#)). There are a few comparative studies which have focused on the electoral success of ethnic minority parties ([\[Hansen, 2006\]](#)) or the parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities ([\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#) and [\[Bochsler, 2011\]](#)). These studies emphasize the relevance of institutional, cultural and socio-economic factors and provide tailored explanations for the representation of ethnic minorities. On the other hand, there is a rich body of literature systematically assessing the electoral fate of small, niche or new parties, in particular on radical right-wing parties. This research has not been fully utilized to study ethnic parties, let alone in central and eastern Europe.⁴

The paper aims at closing this gap and seeks to capitalize on the theoretical and methodological advances made in the study of niche parties to explain the electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. This research question contains two interrelated parts, first, the presence of ethnic minority parties in electoral politics (entry), second, the success of these parties in terms of vote shares. These parts are analyzed simultaneously.⁵

Niche parties are defined as rejecting traditional class-based politics, raising issues cross-cutting existing lines of political divisions, and limiting their issue appeals ([\[Meguid, 2005\]](#)). Ethnic parties fit these criteria, as they generally mobilize on criteria beyond class politics and traditional socio-economic or social liberalism cleavages, highlighting issues of minority representation and targeting ethnic minority voters. Our study takes a comprehensive view, reconciling the broader literature on niche party success with the narrower topic of minority representation in central and eastern Europe. The wider literature offers insights from the Political Opportunity Structure approach ([\[Eisinger, 1973\]](#) and [\[Kitschelt, 1986\]](#)) and formal

models of electoral entry of new parties ([\[Cox, 1997\]](#) and [\[Hug, 2001\]](#)). The former conceptualizes resources of actors and their political-institutional context as constraints in the mobilization of social groups. Similarly, the latter conclude that the costs of electoral entry (depending e.g. on electoral thresholds), the potential electoral support or the saliency of issues new or niche parties draw on and the benefits of office ([Cox, 1997](#)) or of getting high demands accepted by mainstream parties (depending e.g. on the degree of power sharing in the political system; see [Hug, 2001](#)) influence the decision of electoral entry as well as the electoral success ([Hug, 2001](#)) of new or niche parties.

After discussing these streams of literature, the study explains the emergence and the success of ethnic minority parties through the institutionally imposed entry costs and the potential electoral support, looking both at the electoral demands *and* at the strategic reaction of mainstream parties to ethnic demands. Besides classical explanations such as the (properly measured) electoral threshold and population shares, the reactions of political competitors constitute a factor which is extensively discussed in the literature (mainly in a western context, see e.g. [Art, 2007](#); [\[Levi and Hechter, 1985\]](#), [\[Meguid, 2005\]](#), [\[Meguid, 2008\]](#) and [\[Tronconi, 2006\]](#)) but not considered in the empirical applications covering central and eastern Europe we are aware of.⁶

At the same time, we improve in methodological terms. Some previous studies do not include all relevant minorities in their analysis ([\[42\]](#) and [\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#)). Further, the comparative studies either neglect the hierarchical character of data on minorities in countries or avoid them at a tough price by including only one minority per country ([\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#)). The electoral system is regularly measured rather crudely with a dummy variable for its type ([\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#)) or variables such as district magnitude ([\[Hansen, 2006\]](#)). Both variables are not very relevant for minorities that live concentrated in a small area, whereas high legal electoral thresholds can restrict minority representation ([\[Bochsler, 2011\]](#)). Furthermore, most of these studies concentrate more on parliamentary representation without disentangling the preceding steps of entry and electoral success (but see [\[Stroschein, 2001\]](#)). Consequently, imminent problems of selection bias cannot be dealt with, and if ([\[Hansen, 2006\]](#)), this does not take place at the decisive level of entry into the electoral race.

In addition to paying attention to case selection, the hierarchical character of the data and the proper measurement of electoral rules, we particularly tackle the problem of self-selection and consider two distinct levels which are equally important aspects of ethnic representation. The entry of a minority party into the electoral race foregoes any chances to win votes, gain seats in parliament or participate in government. Neglecting this stage would have serious consequences for the validity of our conclusions in regard to the factors influencing the electoral success of minority parties. If abstentions from entering the electoral arena are non-random, as we expect them to be, results concerning the determinants of electoral success derived from the self-selected sample may be severely biased ([\[King et al., 1994: p. 135\]](#); [\[Hug, 2003\]](#)). This risk of selection bias requires a simultaneous analysis of the entry decision and the subsequent electoral success to be able to control for such problems. After controlling for selection bias, factors associated with the probability of electoral support and costs of electoral entry, namely the interaction between thresholds of representation and population shares and the saliency of ethnicity influence the electoral success of ethnic minority parties. Alarming, most of these findings would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.

In the subsequent sections, we attempt to capitalize on the theoretical and methodological advances provided by the wider literature on new or niche parties in order to explain the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe.

2. Electoral success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe

The field of ethnic minority representation in central and eastern Europe is dominated by case studies, which cover single or a small number of countries (instead of many: [\[Alionescu, 2004\]](#) and [\[Barany, 2002\]](#)). Only a few studies have concentrated on the determinants of the electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties or the parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in central and eastern Europe from a comparative perspective ([\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#) and [\[42\]](#)). [Bochsler's \(2011\)](#) focal variables in his analysis of descriptive parliamentary representation are the size and organizational capacity of ethnic minorities. Controls for the electoral system, geographic concentration and historical relations between minority and majority population are introduced as well. Analyzing data on 19 countries in 2007, [Bochsler \(2011\)](#) emphasizes the influence of ethnic minorities' population shares as well as of proportional electoral systems on minority representation. Similar findings regarding electoral systems are reported by [Kostadinova \(2007\)](#), who widens the focus on women and ethnic minority representation in parliament while covering 33 elections in 15 central and eastern European countries. Only the largest ethnic minority per country is included in the study ([Kostadinova, 2007](#): p. 423), which avoids problems associated with the multilevel structure of the data, but results in the loss of a multitude of cases per country. [Hansen \(2006\)](#) conceptualizes political institutions as intervening structures between ethnic cleavages and political outcomes and incorporates the resources of ethnic minorities, the degree of their discrimination and the political opportunities as critical for the mobilization of ethnic minorities. The relationships are tested using a Heckman selection model of parliamentary representation and seat shares of ethnic minority parties from 57 elections in 17 countries. The minorities included are derived from the Minorities at Risk dataset ([Gurr, 2000](#)). District magnitude and ethnic minorities' population share display the expected positive relationships with seat shares of ethnic minority parties, while religious, cultural and economic differences between minority and majority population as well as discrimination carry the reverse sign.

As argued above, these studies provide valuable insights, but offer several potential areas of improvement. Theoretically, they do not fully utilize the framework provided by the wider literature on new or niche parties (e.g. [Hug, 2001](#)). Methodologically, the selection of cases, the measurement of electoral hurdles, the lack of adequate multilevel methodology, and the modelling of self-selection processes are access points to improve on prior research. In the sections to follow, these aspects are addressed and solutions are suggested.

The study at hand draws on the concept of the "Political Opportunity Structure" from research on social movements ([\[Eisinger, 1973\]](#), [\[Kitschelt, 1986\]](#) and [\[Opp, 1996\]](#)) and on models of the strategic entry behaviour of new or niche parties ([\[Cox, 1997\]](#) and [\[Hug, 2001\]](#)). The Political Opportunity Structure approach is explicitly transferred to analyses of minority representation ([Bird, 2005](#)) and the success of niche parties ([Arzheimer and Carter, 2006](#)). In his study of anti-nuclear movements in four countries, [Kitschelt \(1986: 58\)](#) defines the Political Opportunity Structure as "*comprised of specific resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in other*". The concept of a Political Opportunity Structure proposes a focus on different levels which is also appropriate for the question of minority representation. If a minority group, which is

understood here as comprised of both potential voters and political elites, seeks representation via an ethnic minority party, its own as well as contextual features are decisive for success. On the minority group level, the resources at disposition are a factor. Such resources could be of socio-economic or socio-cultural nature. At the same time, the political-institutional context and its responsiveness are emphasized, which allows for or inhibits representation ([Bird, 2005](#)). This is also the focus of the consociational theory ([Lijphart, 1977](#)) and resembles neo-institutionalist thinking in general, with actors nested in institutional contexts ([\[Scharpf, 1997\]](#), [\[Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995\]](#) and [\[Hall and Taylor, 1996\]](#)).

Critics of the Political Opportunity Structure approach point at the importance of considering the motivations and interests of the actors ([Opp, 1996](#)). A related problem is the fuzziness of the concept. Often, a very wide range of factors is subsumed under its label (e.g. [Arzheimer and Carter, 2006](#)). Against this backdrop, a plausible extension is the assumption of instrumentally rational minority elites and voters which seek to maximize their benefit (office, policy, or votes) while minimizing their costs ([\[Cox, 1997\]](#) and [\[Hug, 2001\]](#)). In his seminal 1997 book on electoral systems, Gary W. Cox discusses formal models of strategic entry. The central conclusion is that “[...] such models show that the number of entrants is not limited by anticipations of strategic voting when everyone has an ex ante equal chance of suffering (or benefiting) from it. The only limits that are placed on the number of entrants in equilibrium have to do with the costs of entry and the benefits of office” ([Cox, 1997](#): p. 152). In sum, [Cox \(1997\)](#) identifies three factors which determine levels of electoral entry. These are the costs of entry, the benefits of office and the probability of electoral support. Simon [Hug \(2001\)](#) presents a game-theoretical model of the emergence of new parties. The heart of the model is the perception of new party emergence as a strategic interaction between the group with potential to field a new party and, for a start, one established party. [Hug \(2001](#): p. 46) describes the actions involved in the game as a dynamic process where either a strong or weak potential new party emerges, makes a high or low demand, which can be accepted or rejected by the established party, what enables the potential new party to give in or to form and compete for election. The most intriguing aspect of [Hug’s \(2001\)](#) formal model is that it allows the explicit discussion of results and outcomes as well as the formulation of empirical implications.⁷ The first empirical implication pertains to the saliency of new issues. A second implication cites formation costs which could hinder the formation of parties. The third empirical implication is that more parties will form when the benefits of getting demands accepted by mainstream parties are higher. A fourth implication refers to “fighting costs”, which manifest themselves in electoral thresholds, for example. The fifth and final implication is the flip side of the fourth. It implies that higher electoral benefits encourage weak parties to enter the electoral race.

It has to be noted that [Hug \(2001\)](#) provides a theory of new party entry, not success. While he empirically analyses both the entry and success of new parties, [Hug \(2001](#): 6, 125–6) emphasizes that his theory is incomplete for explaining success. Nevertheless, he maintains that some of the implications for new/niche party formation are based on expectations about electoral success ([Hug, 2001](#): p. 125), including the costs of the electoral fight (depending e.g. on electoral thresholds), issue saliency (equalling the probability of electoral support, determined by e.g. population size), and the benefits of getting demands accepted (depending e.g. on certain types of the degree of power sharing in the political system, such as the number of parties in government). The entry decision is based on the same plus two more factors, namely the formation costs of parties (e.g. depending on party financing and ballot access) and the benefits for weak challengers, the latter being measured using the same indicators as the electoral fighting costs, as both variables are highly related ([Hug, 2001](#): p. 87–8).⁸ Furthermore, [Hug \(2001\)](#) derives often counterintuitive expectations from his model

considering the strategic decisions of mainstream and new parties theoretically, such as that rather strong parties might emerge given high electoral thresholds ([Hug, 2001](#): 59, 138). Finally, that a factor increases the probability of new parties entering the electoral race does not necessarily mean that these parties are more successful. Such diverging expectations will also be formulated in the hypotheses to follow.

Both the Political Opportunity Structure approach as well as the formal Rational Choice approaches point at similar determinants of electoral entry and success. The latter are useful as they provide a more parsimonious model which explicates the mechanisms involved in niche party entry and success. The paper at hand aims at testing several implications of the models of niche party success proposed by [Cox \(1997\)](#) and [Hug \(2001\)](#), while using new empirical observations. The empirical implications tested here can be understood in terms of the main decisions minority elites and voters face, which are encompassing the costs of electoral entry, measured by the strength electoral rules, and mainly the probability of electoral support, influenced by electoral demands (which are measured using the saliency of ethnicity and population shares of minorities) and reactions of mainstream parties for electoral success.⁹ These three country- or minority-level explanations are also central in the wider literature treating new, small, or niche parties. A sociological stream argues that the demand in the electorate drives the success of these parties ([Lipset and Rokkan, 1967](#)). On the other hand, political-institutional approaches offer two more explanations. First, the permissiveness of the political system, in particular the electoral system, is deemed crucial in the entry decision and success of minority parties ([Duverger, 1963](#)). Furthermore, the reactions of mainstream parties towards the “new” issues are of relevance for the success of niche parties ([Meguid, 2005](#)). These arguments are discussed in turn and hypotheses are derived. The implications for electoral entry and success are considered separately where applicable.

The starting point for the analysis has to be the demand for minority representation and its strength. Where there is no ethnic cleavage, or where it is overwhelmed by other, more salient cleavages, ethnic representation is simply not needed and the probability of electoral support approaches zero. In the case of minorities, data on the saliency of ethnic issues is needed. In the period of transition and of state-building, when ethnic relations in young states are re-negotiated, ethnicity becomes a relevant element of social identification, so that ethnic minority groups constitute a group that might aim for political representation ([Birnie, 2007](#)). Therefore, we treat those citizens who share a minority identity as a group with new political demands, and the population share of minority groups might be the best available approximation to measure them. The measure should also be associated with the saliency of ethnic issues.¹⁰ As population shares are an incomplete measure of electoral support, expert judgements of the saliency of the ethnic cleavage are considered as a supplement. Generally, demands are only probabilistically translating into electoral support.

Social demands for representation are not sufficient to explain party formation, as research on the number of parties in political systems has shown ([\[Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997\]](#), [\[Benoit, 2002\]](#), [\[Kostadinova, 2002\]](#) and [\[Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994\]](#)). In addition, the electoral structure has to be permissive. Conversely, permissive electoral rules will only result in more parties if there is demand for them. This equals an interaction between electoral rules and societal heterogeneity as the explanation for the emergence of parties. Similarly, for the minority-level approach advanced here, in particular population size should have an intuitive interactive relation with the electoral structure as an explanation for ethnic minority party entry and success, as population shares and electoral thresholds are measured in comparable units (per cent of the population and per cent of voters, respectively). If the share of (minority) voters is large enough to pass the electoral threshold, electoral success is achieved.

‘Strong’ electoral systems impose high costs on electoral entry ([Duverger, 1963](#)). The consociational theory ([\[Lijphart, 1977\]](#) and [\[Lijphart, 1991\]](#)) focuses largely on political institutions, in particular electoral structures. The dominant view is that proportional representation is associated with higher levels of minority representation through ethnic minority parties. However, the results from simple categorizations of proportional and majoritarian are not clear cut: Some studies support the hypothesis ([\[Golder, 2003\]](#), [\[Jackman and Volpert, 1996\]](#), [\[Redding and Viterna, 1999\]](#), [\[Tavits, 2006\]](#) and [\[Willey, 1998\]](#)), while others find evidence for no ([\[Harmel and Robertson, 1985\]](#), [\[Hauss and Rayside, 1978\]](#), [\[Meguid, 2005\]](#) and [\[Van der Brug et al., 2005\]](#)) or even a negative relationship between proportional representation and the success of new parties ([\[Müller-Rommel, 1993\]](#)). For the present sample, a simple dummy variable for the electoral structure is deeply inappropriate. While the electoral systems in central and eastern Europe either belong to the PR family, or are mixed systems, district and parliament sizes vary considerably, and some countries impose very considerable legal thresholds, so that they are not permissive enough to allow ethnic minorities to become represented. A finer measure is needed, which will be introduced below. Electoral demand and electoral rules (and their interaction) are expected to have the same implications for entry and for success.

H1 Restrictive electoral rules will only reduce the probability of electoral entry and the extent of electoral success of ethnic minority parties when demand for minority representation is low.

In addition to electoral demands and institutional constraints by the electoral system, the ability and willingness of other parties in the system to react to minority interests influences the electoral fate of minority parties by changing the probability of electoral support. [\[Meguid, 2005\]](#) and [\[Meguid, 2008\]](#) distinguishes three basic strategies of main parties, namely adversarial, accommodative, and dismissive reactions. At this point, there are differentiated expectations for electoral entry and success.¹¹ Accommodation should make the entry of ethnic minority parties less likely, as the competitors offer the representation of minority interests. Their relative advantage, related to their size, is their higher potential to pass electoral thresholds, gain (possibly government) office and the more diverse policy package on offer, as ethnic minority voters might have more salient political issues than the ethnic one.¹² The expectation for electoral success is less clear. Accommodation could diminish electoral chances of minority parties for the same reasons it reduces the probability of entry ([\[Meguid, 2008\]](#)). On the other hand, minority parties could be preferred as the accommodative reaction legitimizes the demands of the minority and they are perceived as the true advocates of the group ([\[Arzheimer, 2009\]](#)).

On the other hand, the inter-ethnic outbidding logic suggests that, if there are adversarial reactions, minority voters might abandon moderate parties, and switch to minority parties as they constitute the only available representatives of minority interests (e.g. [\[Saideman et al., 2002\]](#): p. 108; [\[Fearon, 2006\]](#): pp. 858–9; [\[Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972\]](#): pp. 62–88). This should increase both the probability of entry, as ethnic issues become more salient without the perspective for the satisfaction of demands given adversarial reactions of mainstream parties, and the electoral success of ethnic minority parties, as minority voters and elites are mobilized ([\[Meguid, 2008\]](#)).

Finally, if there are no reactions towards minority interests at all (controlling for demand), i.e. dismissive reactions, these are expected to represent a strong, suppressive variant of adversarial reactions, refusing the approval of the relevance of the issues the minority party puts forward ([\[Meguid, 2008\]](#)). It should be associated with higher levels of electoral entry

(given some demand) on the one hand, as minority issues are not politically represented, but also with weaker electoral performances of ethnic minority parties on the other hand, as these have to establish the relevance of their demands by themselves. In sum, the expectations are:

H2a Accommodative reactions of the competitors in the political system diminish the probability of electoral entry, while adversarial or dismissive reactions increase the probability of entry.

H2b Adversarial reactions of the competitors in the political system increase the electoral success of ethnic minority parties, dismissive reactions decrease the extent of success, and there is no clear expectation for the effect of accommodative reactions.

We refrain from incorporating further system-level variables such as the number of parties and party system polarization, as we are mainly interested in the focal relationships described and because these factors are partly consequences of electoral rules and societal heterogeneity. In the section to follow, design, data and measurement decisions are discussed.

3. Data and measurement

3.1. Design and case selection

The study covers 19 post-communist democratic countries within the geographic borders of Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Within these, 130 ethnic minorities are examined. The basic units of analysis are ethnic groups, not single minority parties.¹³ All except for the largest ethnic groups in a country are defined as (numeric) ethnic minorities, including constituent ethnic groups, constitutional ethnic minorities, and not officially recognised ethnic minorities. Ethnic identities are often constructed against a cultural, historic, linguistic, physical or religious backdrop (see [\[Weber, 2002\]](#) and [\[Fearon, 2003\]](#)). Generally, the selection of ethnic minorities is highly problematic and always bears the risk of selection bias. Theoretically, the number of latent ethnic minorities approaches infinity ([\[Hug, 2003\]](#): p. 256). This fact stems directly from the definition of ethnic identity which refers to it as a social construction ([\[Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008\]](#): p. 519). Prior research on ethnic minorities is often focused on “visible” minorities ([\[Bird, 2005\]](#)), minorities “at risk” ([\[Hansen, 2006\]](#)) or the largest minority per country only ([\[Kostadinova, 2007\]](#)). All these selection rules carry the risk of causing severe selection bias and false inferences. There is a high probability that these groups differ systematically from other, non-regarded groups in aspects which we cannot control for. We attempt to minimize the problem by cross-validating data from official census statistics and state-independent sources, including the “Minorities at Risk” project (MAR) and information available from NGOs. We selected minorities on which information was available with a population share of 0.1 per cent or above. While official data arguably should be biased in favour of well-integrated minorities, state-independent sources allow us to identify groups that are discriminated against by the government.¹⁴

Ethnic identities are very flexible, socially constructed concepts, and can be subject to political manipulation. In the introduction, we defined ethnicity as a common view of a group identity, based on aspects such as cultural habits, language, religion, regional belonging, or race, connotated with a common ethnic label ([\[Hale, 2008\]](#): p. 47). In the countries under investigation, ethnic identities appear to be very stable and a clear-cut category and all ethnic groups have preceded the current political regimes and the formation of political parties. This

facilitates our study, since with little risk we can treat ethnicity as an exogenous category for our purpose.¹⁵ The last election per country prior to the midst of 2007 was covered in the dataset, resulting in a cross-sectional multilevel design.

3.2. Entry and electoral success of ethnic minority parties

The dependent variables of the study at hand are the entry into to the electoral race and the subsequent electoral success of ethnic minority parties. We define ethnic minority parties as parties which clearly and overwhelmingly address an ethnic minority electorate, and whose main political goal is the representation of an ethnic minority (see also [Horowitz, 1985](#): p. 291). *Entry* into the electoral race is coded 1 for an ethnic minority if at least one party directed toward it has participated with an own list in the election, otherwise entry is coded 0. The information on participation is derived from official election results, which list all parties competing for votes.¹⁶ *Electoral success* is defined as the sum of the vote share v of all ethnic parties representing the same ethnic minority in a country.

[Appendix 1](#) provides an overview of minority-related data in 19 central and eastern European countries. The table summarizes the number of minorities, their population shares, their parties' election results in the last elections and the resulting number of seats in the national assembly. Minority groups that are not listed with a vote share value did not provide a party that participated for them in the election.¹⁷ The data indicates that the relationships between the minorities' population shares and their vote shares as well as seat shares in the national assembly vary strongly between the countries of central and eastern Europe. While all minority groups in Kosovo and Romania – even those counting just 0.1 per cent of the population – are represented in the respective national assemblies, minorities in other countries are not represented at all, including groups counting more than 10 per cent of the suffraged population of a country (e.g. ethnic Russians in Estonia).¹⁸

3.3. Electoral demands: population shares and the saliency of ethnic issues

Sociological explanations suggest electoral demands as the driving force behind electoral success. As an initial proxy for electoral demands for parliamentary representation, we use the population share of ethnic minorities, regarding those eligible to vote. As [Appendix 1](#) indicates, the number of minorities varies rather strongly between countries, as do the sizes of the groups. Large minority groups like Russians in the Baltic States or Albanians in Macedonia are accompanied by very small minorities. In Montenegro, all minority groups combined represent a majority of the overall population, whereas minority population shares in Poland only add up to 0.6 per cent.

Obviously, the population shares of ethnic minorities are an incomplete measure of the demand for minority representation. While large population shares should be associated with an increase in the demand for descriptive political representation, not every minority group member will place the most saliency on minority issues as such. To control for these different saliency levels at least at a general, national level, [Benoit and Laver's \(2006\)](#) expert survey serves as an additional database (see [Appendix 2](#)). Here, country experts were asked not only to place parties on different policy dimensions, but also to judge the saliency of these policy dimensions. We rely on an expert survey that was carried out before our dependent variable was measured, what should reduce problems of endogeneity. As no question directly addresses ethnic minority issues, we rely on a question referring to state nationalism. Both issues are closely connected, as state nationalism in transition countries, and all the political questions related to it, such as state language or religious issues, also open up questions about

the identity of ethnic minority groups and their rights. Consequently, we refer to this measure as the saliency of ethnicity, while highlighting that it is only an approximation. The mean importance of the issue across parties is weighted by the parties' vote shares in order to measure overall policy saliency of ethnic minority issues at the country level ([Benoit and Laver, 2006](#): p. 243).

3.4. Electoral systems

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, electoral systems in the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe have undergone significant changes. Most of those changes have been implemented until 1995, after the countries had put in place their democratic constitutions ([Armingeon and Careja, 2008](#): p. 439). As one of the major developments, almost all countries sooner or later adopted systems of proportional representation (PR). Out of the 19 countries we examine in this article, for the elections that our study refers to, only Albania, Hungary and Lithuania have retained elements of majority representation.¹⁹ But not a single country in central and eastern Europe still holds its elections on the basis of a pure first-past-the-post system (see [Appendix 2](#)). The sizes of the legislatures range between 42 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 460 in Poland, with a mean of 192 representatives. The average district magnitude of all 19 countries equals 96 mandates.

Regularly, the *permissiveness of electoral systems* is operationalized rather crudely through dummy variables for the type of the electoral system or through the mean or median district magnitude. We use the more precise [Taagepera's \(2002\)](#) measure of the nationwide threshold of representation (for critical comments, see [Bischoff, 2009](#)).²⁰ It reports the approximate vote share needed to gain a 50/50 chance of obtaining a seat in parliament and is computed as follows:

$$T = \frac{.75}{\sqrt{(M+1)(S/M)}}$$

[Taagepera \(2002\)](#) uses predictive modelling, which is adopted from physics, to determine theoretical boundaries of the threshold which are then empirically reconfirmed ([Taagepera, 2008](#)). The resulting formula of the nationwide threshold T requires information on average district magnitude M and the assembly size S . The formula can be applied to any type of electoral system and does not presuppose any assumptions about the local concentration of groups. Rather, it represents a compromise which takes into account that from a nationwide perspective, much lower vote shares are sufficient to gain a majority in a single district where the voters are concentrated.²¹ The measure is explicitly designed and tested to accommodate even complex mixed electoral rules as assembly size captures compensatory seats well ([Taagepera, 2002](#): p. 394–6). For the purposes of this analysis, the nationwide threshold generated by parliament and district sizes is replaced by the legal threshold in case the latter exists, exceeds the former, and applies to ethnic minorities (see [Appendix 2](#)). The national *legal* thresholds of representation (counting only those applicable to parties of ethnic minorities²²) in the 19 countries vary between 0 and 6 per cent. Compared to the legal thresholds, the *effective* nationwide thresholds, measured as proposed by [Taagepera \(2002\)](#) are fairly low, and reach at maximum 2.41 per cent. Interestingly, this is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that has not put any legal obstacles in place, but with 42 seats, it has by far the smallest parliament of all countries.

3.5. Special electoral rules and bans of ethnic parties

Besides legal and effective thresholds, electoral rules also contain special rules for the election of ethnic minority representatives, apart from the countries that exempt parties of ethnic minorities from their legal thresholds. The approaches to ensure minority representation differ across the countries of central and eastern Europe. Most countries' electoral laws do not provide for special regulations as regards the participation and representation of minority groups that live within their borders. Yet, a couple of countries have put in place several special regulations that are supposed to help minority parties achieve representation in parliament ([Bochsler, 2010b](#)). In Slovenia's parliament, which consists of 90 representatives, two representatives of the Italian and Hungarian minorities are elected separately by their groups. In Kosovo, 20 out of the 120 parliamentary seats are reserved for the country's minorities. There is no special district for this minority vote. Minority parties take part in the same election as all other parties, but are awarded these additional 20 seats, based on quotas for each minority group. In Croatia, the Serb Community is entitled to elect three representatives; the other five mandates are split among the other minorities in the country. Each minority group (or several smaller minorities jointly) elect their representatives in special districts. In Romania, if the legal threshold is not surpassed, the minority is entitled one seat as soon as the number of votes for the largest of its parties equals at least 10 per cent of the average number of votes needed to elect a deputy. As mentioned above, exceptions from legal thresholds are considered in the coding of the thresholds generated by the electoral system. The other forms of special regulations for ethnic minorities, such as reserved seats, are accounted for using a dummy variable which is coded 1 if there are special regulations and 0 if there are not. The flip side of special electoral rules for minorities is bans of ethnic parties, which officially are applied in Albania and Bulgaria. Both these variables are introduced as controls at the stage of electoral entry.²³

3.6. Reactions of established parties

We include a second politico-institutional context factor in the analysis: the reactions of mainstream parties when faced with small, ethnically based competitors. To measure these reactions, data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is used, which provides content analyses of party manifestos ([Klingemann et al., 2006](#)).²⁴ The data includes information on issue saliency and on the positioning of parties, covering a wide range of empirical policy areas. The most recent data is usually available for the election prior to the election for which electoral entry and success are measured.²⁵ Therefore, the reactions of mainstream parties at the election date are approximated using the data from the last election. This requires some stability assumption of party positions. At the same time, earlier statements of mainstream parties might still be relevant for the decisions of voters. To construct the scale, in a first step, seven items which are related to the positioning of parties towards ethnic minority issues were selected from the project's codebook.²⁶ Three of these, including references to "Cultural Autonomy: Positive" (item 6071 in the CMP), "Multiculturalism pro Roma: Positive" (6072) and "Multiculturalism pro Roma: Negative" (6081) were not covered in the manifestos studied. Four relevant items, which also have non-zero entries and are subsequently used to compute the reactions scores, are "Minorities Abroad: Positive" (7052), referring to ethnic minorities living in the manifesto country and "Multiculturalism: Positive" (607) on the accommodative side.²⁷ On the adversarial side "Multiculturalism: Negative" (608) and "National Way of Life: Positive" (601) are available. For each item, the percentage of quasi-sentences in the manifesto referring to it is reported. Following [Meguid \(2005\)](#), three variants of reactions could be theoretically considered: adversarial (negative) reactions, accommodative (positive) reactions, and also dismissal (no

reactions at all). To identify one major rival mainstream party, the two largest available parties in terms of vote shares per country are considered.²⁸ To capture the fact that the largest party is not necessarily the main competitor of the niche parties, we select the party per country which displays the most intense overall reaction, i.e. the sum of adversarial and accommodative reactions. This arguably reflects higher threat from the niche parties. For this mainstream party the net reactions are computed as the difference between accommodative and adversarial reactions, yielding an accommodative-adversarial scale.²⁹

4. Empirical analysis

Studies of the electoral success of ethnic minority parties are prone to problems of selection bias ([\[Hug, 2003\]](#) and [\[King et al., 1994\]](#): p. 131; [Selb and Pituctin, 2010](#)). In a nutshell, the representational success of ethnic minority parties depends on their decision to enter the electoral race in the first place. The problem starts with self-selection. Minority elites will only field party in anticipation of success for particular reasons. Therefore, if studying only the existing parties of ethnic minorities, we end up with a sample of particularly “strong” minorities, while those who anticipate a failure do not even run for elections. For instance, due to demographic reasons (a disproportionately high share of under 18 years old with no voting rights) and their low literacy rate, the population share of Roma communities might overestimate the potential electoral support for Roma parties ([UNPD, 2003](#): p. 74). Anticipating the difficulties of gathering sufficient electoral support, it is plausible that in certain countries with high electoral thresholds Roma parties do not even appear on the electoral ballot. Such a selection effect can impressively be observed in Serbia, where in the 2003 elections, due to the high electoral threshold of 5 per cent, no Roma party was competing, and only one list of ethnic minorities was eligible, an alliance of several minority parties and a regional party, ran in elections. After lowering the threshold for minority parties, six minority parties decided to run with their own lists, including two parties of the Serbian Roma ([Bochsler, 2008](#)). As we can not control all of the reasons for the electoral success of ethnic minority parties, concomitant factors which are modelled will be underestimated, for example the effect of the electoral system.

4.1. Model

The problem of selection bias is countered by selection models ([Heckman, 1979](#)), which can also be formulated as hierarchical mixed distribution models ([Selb and Pituctin, 2010](#)).³⁰ The basic idea behind [Heckman’s \(1979\)](#) selection model is to correct for self-selection bias. Conceptually, the aim is to control for the unobserved factors influencing both the selection into the sample and the outcome, which is done by accounting for the residuals from a selection equation in an outcome equation. These residuals carry the information we are interested in: the unknown reasons to enter the electoral race which are the same unknown reasons to be successful.

Here, a flexible, one step version of the selection model is presented following [Rabe-Hesketh \(2002\)](#) and the application of the model to the electoral entry and success of niche parties by [Selb and Pituctin \(2010\)](#).³¹ The hierarchical structure of the model is three-fold: The highest level is that of countries. The middle level is comprised of minorities. So far, we have a conventional multilevel structure. To model selection bias, a third, even lower level is introduced: in each minority, two responses are nested, the decision to enter the electoral race, coded as yes (1) or no (0), and the electoral success expressed as vote shares in per cent. Hence the name mixed distribution model. Two equations are needed to estimate the model,

which are linked through their correlated minority-level error terms to capture selection bias. The random intercepts probit model for electoral entry is presented as a latent hurdle model.

$$d_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta X_{ij} + \gamma Z_j + \mu_{1j} + \varepsilon_{1ij}$$

Where the latent response d_{ij} denotes the propensity of electoral entry of minority i in country j . The observed entry decision is 1 if $d_{ij} > 0$, otherwise it is 0. The response is modelled by a general intercept β_0 , a vector of individual-level covariates X_{ij} (where β denotes a vector of coefficients) and a vector of country-level covariates Z_j (where γ denotes a vector of coefficients) while controlling for country-level variance μ_{1j} . For μ_{1j} , a zero mean and a variance of ν_1^2 are assumed. The individual-level residual ε_{1ij} of the latent response is unobserved and conventionally assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 in the probit model. The equation for electoral success is formulated in a similar fashion, but with a linear link function.

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta X_{ij} + \gamma Z_j + \mu_{2j} + \varepsilon_{2ij}$$

Here, the vote shares y_{ij} of minority i in country j are modelled by a general intercept β_0 , a vector of individual-level covariates X_{ij} (where β denotes a vector of coefficients) and a vector of country-level covariates Z_j (where γ denotes a vector of coefficients) while controlling for country-level variance μ_{2j} with the assumptions of a mean of zero and a variance of ν_2^2 . The sets of covariates in the selection and the outcome equation do not need to be identical, and the identification of the model is eased if they are not, as is the case here. An individual-level residual ε_{2ij} (normally distributed with variance σ^2) is estimated. Both models are linked through correlated errors at the minority level, indicating potential selection bias which is captured via the estimation of a common factor explaining this correlation ([Rabe-Hesketh, 2002](#)).³² The correlation represents the extent to which the unexplained part of the entry decision is linked to the unexplained part of electoral success.

$$\rho(\varepsilon_{1ij}, \varepsilon_{2ij}) = \text{cov}(\varepsilon_{1ij}, \varepsilon_{2ij}) / 1\sigma$$

The correlation $\rho(\varepsilon_{1ij}, \varepsilon_{2ij})$ is the covariance of the error terms from the minority-level divided by the product of their standard deviations. All parameters can be estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood methodology ([Vella, 1998](#)).

4.2. Results

Model 1 in [Table 1](#) reports the results of a naïve linear multilevel model, which is solely based on the election results of the minority parties which actually entered the electoral race. Apart from population shares (in particular at low electoral thresholds), all other factors, including electoral thresholds at different population shares, the saliency of ethnicity and the reactions of political competitors fail to show statistically significant influence. [Fig. 1](#) shows the estimated naïve marginal effect of the electoral threshold at different population shares, which, according to H1, should be negative and statistically significant for low population shares only, but appears to be empirically absent.

Table 1. Naïve model of electoral success and hierarchical selection model of electoral entry and success.

	Model 1: naïve model	Model 2: selection model	
	Electoral success (vote share in per cent)	Electoral entry (yes/no)	Electoral success (vote share in per cent)
<i>Minority level</i>			
Electoral demand: population share (per cent)	0.81 (0.22)***	1.29 (0.51)**	0.94 (0.04)***
<i>Country level</i>			
Threshold of representation (per cent)	0.19 (0.66)	−0.23 (0.22)	−0.23 (0.11)**
Electoral demand: saliency of nationalism	0.07 (0.56)	0.20 (0.20)	0.22 (0.11)**
Reactions of political competitors (ac.-ad.)	−0.02 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.08)	0.03 (0.02)
Special electoral provisions		2.01 (1.25)*	
Ban on ethnic parties		−0.06 (0.73)	
Pop. share × Threshold	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.14 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.01)
Constant	−2.68 (7.94)	−4.92 (3.21)	−6.97 (1.62)
Variance constant	2.75 (1.40)	1.32 (1.37)	1.12 (0.43)
$\rho(\epsilon_{1ij}, \epsilon_{2ij})$ (minorities)		.81	
N (mixed responses)		169	
N (minorities)	39	130	39
N (countries)	18	19	18

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Regression coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses. The naïve model is estimated using the xtmixed command in Stata. The second model is estimated using the gllamm package for Stata, specifying a hierarchical mixed distribution model. Both models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood.




Fig. 1. Naïve marginal effect of electoral threshold on success across population shares.

Model 2 in [Table 1](#) refers to the hierarchical selection model described above, which simultaneously estimates a model of electoral entry and success, catering for potential selection bias. An empty version of the model (not reported), which contains the fixed and random intercepts only, allows to compute intraclass correlations, which are country-specific variance shares. For electoral entry, the intraclass correlation equals .92, for electoral success, it equals .46. These context-induced variance shares are considerable and provide strong justifications to model the hierarchical data structure of minorities nested in countries. The results of the selection model with covariates are given in [Table 1](#).³³ There is strong evidence for the need to model potential selection bias: The correlation between the errors of both equations is a very high .81 at the minority level. In other words, those minorities which decide to compete in elections clearly are not a random sample of the existing minorities. Rather, only those with positive residuals, i.e. those who have some advantage which we cannot control for, will run for election.

The stage of electoral entry is modelled to avoid selection bias in the analysis of electoral success but also substantially interesting in itself. For electoral entry, the results partly support the expectations regarding the influence of population shares in interaction with the electoral threshold. Interaction effects in logistic and probit regression and their statistical significance cannot be directly interpreted as they can vary widely depending on the values of the other covariates in the model ([Norton et al., 2004](#)). Therefore, the effect of a one-unit change in the electoral threshold from its mean on the predicted probability of entry as population size changes is displayed graphically in [Fig. 2](#), using simulations to determine the uncertainty of the estimates ([Brambor et al., 2005](#)). The other covariates in the model are held at certain values, so that the effects are valid for minorities in countries with mean salience of ethnicity, mean reactions of competitors and no special electoral regulations or ban of ethnic parties. The results show that the predicted probability of electoral entry is negatively affected by

electoral thresholds when the population size is small, but not when it is larger. At population sizes of about 4 per cent, the effect can be as large as a change of about $-.25$ in the predicted probability of entry for a one-unit change in the electoral threshold from its mean. Such magnitudes are very much in line with intuitive expectations about which groups suffer most from higher thresholds.




Fig. 2. Marginal effect of electoral threshold on entry across population shares (selection model).

The other factors in the model of electoral entry point in the expected direction, including the saliency of ethnicity, the reactions of political competitors³⁴ and bans on ethnic parties, but except special electoral regulations, all of them miss conventional levels of statistical significance.

Turning to the electoral success side of the model, the same set of variables as in Model 1 is introduced, but considering potential self-selection bias. The interaction between the electoral threshold and population shares indicates that higher electoral thresholds are associated with less success, but only when population shares are small. For the linear model of electoral success, this can be demonstrated in a graph of the marginal effect of the electoral threshold for different population shares, considering that the constitutive effects on electoral threshold refers to situations where the conditioning variable (population size) equals zero and that meaningful marginal effects and measures of uncertainty need to be computed for different levels of the moderating variable (following [Brambor et al., 2005](#), see [Fig. 3](#)).




Fig. 3. Marginal effect of electoral threshold on success across population shares (selection model).

The effect appears to be modest but statistically significant for small minorities, slightly more pronounced for medium-sized minorities and loses its statistical significance for large populations.³⁵ A one-unit increase in the electoral threshold can result in a reduction of the electoral success of about -0.25 to -0.5 percentage points for minority populations between 0 and 15 per cent. Furthermore, the saliency of ethnic issues is positively related to electoral success. The model predicts a 0.22 increase in vote shares for a one-unit increase in saliency (which is measured on a 1–20 scale). The reactions of political competitors still fail to reach levels of statistical significance, even after taking self-selection into account. In sum, the results lend support to Hypothesis 1 on the interaction between electoral rules and demands, but not for Hypothesis 2 on the reactions of political competitors. Remarkably, most of the findings are missed out when selection bias is not accounted for (see Model 1 and Fig. 1), including the interaction effect between the electoral threshold and population shares and the positive effect of the saliency of ethnicity. This observation strongly underpins the necessity to consider self-selection bias in research on niche party success.

5. Conclusion

The paper discussed and analyzed political-institutional and sociological determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties. We report evidence that ethnic minority parties only run and succeed in elections if they find a sufficiently large basis of support in order to pass the electoral threshold. These results rely on several improvements of existing research. This paper draws on formal game-theoretical models to explain the entry and success of new parties ([Cox, 1997] and [Hug, 2001]). Based on this theoretical basis, it incorporates the reaction of mainstream parties, improves beyond previous measures for the electoral system, and the applied methodology considers possible self-selection effects of strategic entry.³⁶

First, relying on the Political Opportunity Structure approach and formal models of the strategic entry behaviour of new parties, we study the costs of entry (electoral thresholds) as well as the probability of electoral support (reactions of competitors and electoral demands). The scarce prior studies on the success of ethnic minority parties did not fully take into account the advances in the wider literature on new or niche parties.

Second, the operationalization of electoral structures is advanced beyond simple PR dummies, output measures such as the [Gallagher \(1991\)](#) index or thresholds of representation which apply to the constituency-level only. These classical measures appear as ill-suited for the study of the entry and success of ethnic minority parties, since ethnic minorities often live clustered in a small area. Therefore, the effect of small electoral districts is not the same as for other non-territorial divides. For our purpose, [Taagepera's \(2002\)](#) national threshold of representation is used which attempts at a general, continuous input measure of representation valid across a wide range of electoral systems.

Third, studies of the electoral success of new or nice parties have widely ignored self-selection bias: Not all minorities decide to enter the electoral race; they rather self-select themselves into the sample of contenders. They are very likely to be advantaged in some sense we cannot control for. Therefore the risk of misjudging the impact of factors such as electoral thresholds is the logical consequence. This was encountered by introducing a selection model formulated as a hierarchical mixed distribution model. This model also is hierarchical in the sense that the nesting of minorities in countries is accounted for. Ignoring such dependencies between minorities leads to overconfidence in context effects.

Most alarming, all the substantial findings of this paper, except the almost trivial positive effect of population shares at low electoral thresholds on electoral success, would have been overlooked if self-selection was not modelled. The results of the hierarchical selection model of electoral entry and success of ethnic minorities pointed at statistical significant influence of most of the explanations proposed after controlling for self-selection. The results of Model 2 show that the factors affecting the electoral success and of entry have some commonalities. The decision to join the electoral competition is mainly determined by the expected electoral success ([Hug, 2001](#)). Only if the electoral support is likely to surpass the restriction imposed through electoral thresholds, minority parties are likely to run in elections.

On the other hand, the reactions of political competitors ([Meguid, 2008](#)) fail to show any systematic influence, at least in the study at hand. Whether this is due to measurement issues or more systematic, for example because new democracies are studied ([Hug, 2001](#): p. 6), is a matter for further research. The timing of elections has equally been black-boxed ([Art, 2007](#)). Such research could also incorporate additional minority-level data on mobilization resources, and should consider the consequences of descriptive representation ([Pitkin, 1967](#)) and ([Mansbridge, 1999](#)). The motivation of the research at hand was the expected positive effect of descriptive representation on the political integration of ethnic minorities. Several additional steps in this direction are needed to assess such effects, starting with policy congruence between ethnic minority members and their representatives, and political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy among the minority population.

Acknowledgements

We are extremely grateful to Peter Selb for his invaluable advice and help, to Raphael Magin, Anwen Elias, Edina Szöcsik, Debra Hevenstone and Gwendolyn Whittaker for their inspiring comments and to Steffen Hurka for his competent research assistance. Last but not least, we

would like to thank Klodiana Vogli und Gëzim Selaci, who coded party manifestos for obtaining reactions of mainstream parties from Kosovo. All remaining errors are ours.

Appendix 1. Ethnic minorities, population shares, and electoral success.

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Albania	2005	Macedonians	1.2		
		South Slavs	1.2		
		Vlachs	2.5		
		Roma	3		
		Greeks	4	0.89	1.43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2006	Croat	17.3	8.64	11.90
		Serb	31.3	31.49	26.19
		Roma	0.1		
		Slovene	0.1		
		Turks	9.5	11.93	14.17
Bulgaria	2005	Vlachs	4.6		
		Macedonians	2.9		
		Roma	3.7	0.17	
		Other slav-speaking muslims	2.9		
		Hungarians	0.5	s.r.*	0.66
Croatia	2003	Roma	0.2		
		Slovene	0.5		
		Serb	4.5	0.02	1.97
		Bosniaks	0.5	s.r.*	0.66
		Albanian	0.4		

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Czech Republic	2006	Roma	0.1		
		Hungarians	0.1		
		German	0.4		
		Slovak	1.9		
		Moravian	3.7	0.23	
		Polish	0.5		
		Silesian	0.1		
		Ukrainian	0.2		
Estonia	2007	Finnish	0.8		
		Ukrainian	2.1		
		Russian	13	1.20	
		Belarusian	1.2		
		Slovak	0.2		
Hungary	2006	Roma	1.9	0.08	
		German	0.6		
		Gorani	1	0.20	0.83
Kosovo	2004	Serbs	7	0.25	8.33
		Roma	1.7	0.15	3.33
		Turks	1	1.21	2.5
		Bosniaks	1.9	1.10	3.33
		Belarusian	1.4		
Latvia	2006	Ukrainian	0.6		
		Lithuanian	0.9		

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Lithuania	2004	Russian	18.2	20.45	23
		Polish	2.2		
		Jews	0.4		
		Roma	0.4		
		Germans	0.1		
		Russian	8.2		
		Belorussian	1.5		
		Ukrainian	1		
		Polish	6.9	3.79	1.42
		Roma	3		
Macedonia	2006	Bosniak	0.8		
		Albanian	22.9	20.13	23.33
		Serb	2	0.14	
		Turkish	4	0.10	
		Vlachs	0.5		
		Ukrainian	8.4		
		Russian	5.9	3.75	
Moldova	2005	Romanian	2.2		
		Gagauz	4.4		
		Bulgarian	1.9		
		Roma	0.42		
Montenegro	2006	Serbs	31.99	14.68	16
		Croats	1.1		

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Poland	2005	Muslims	3.97		
		Bosniaks	7.77	3.76	
		Albanians	5.03	2.52	2.67
		Germans	0.4	0.34	0.43
		Belarussians	0.1		
		Ukrainians	0.1		
		Ukrainians	0.4	0.11	0.29
		Hungarians	8.5	6.17	6.36
		Turks	0.1	0.21	0.29
		Tartars	0.1	0.06	0.29
Romania	2004	Germans	0.9	0.35	0.29
		Slovaks	0.1	0.06	0.29
		Roma	6.4	0.70	0.29
		Serbs	0.1	0.07	0.29
		Lipovanians	0.1	0.10	0.29
		Bosniaks	1.82	0.80	0.80
		Bunjevci	0.27		
		Romanians	0.46		
		Yugoslavs	1.08		
		Ruthenians	0.21		
Serbia	2007	Albanians	0.82	0.30	0.40
		Croats	0.94		
		Montenegrins	0.92		

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Slovak Republic	2006	Macedonians	0.35		
		Slovaks	0.79		
		Moslems	0.26		
		Romanies	1.44	0.90	0.80
		Hungarians	3.91	1.50	1.20
		Bulgarians	0.27		
		Vlachs	0.53		
		Polish	0.1		
		Roma	1.8		
		Hungarian	10.6	11.68	13.33
		Czech	1.1		
		Ruthenian	0.6		
		German	0.1		
		Ukrainians	0.2		
		Croat	3		
Slovenia	2004	Roma	0.2		
		Serb	2		
		Italians	0.1	s.r.*	1.11
		Hungarian	0.4	s.r.*	1.11
		Yugoslav	0.6		
		Bosniak	1		
		Albanians	0.3		
		Montenegrians	0.1		

Country	Election	Min. group	Pop. share (%)	Vote share (%)	Seat share (%)
Ukraine	2006	Macedonians	0.2		
		Jewish	0.2		
		Hungarians	0.3		
		Poles	0.3		
		Moldovan	0.5		
		Greeks	0.2		
		Crimean Tatars	0.5		
		Bulgarians	0.4		
		Belarusian	0.3		
		Romanians	0.3		
		Russian	17.3	3.05	
		Tatars	0.2		
		Armenians	0.2		
		Roma	0.1		
		Azeri	0.1		
		Georgians	0.1		
		Germans	0.1		
		Gaugasians	0.1		

Sources: Official election results for vote and seat shares; official census statistics for population shares. See [Bochsler \(2011\)](#) for details. *Note:* *special rules (s.r.): These minorities did not have to compete in the regular elections because of provisions but gained parliamentary representation.

Appendix 2. Politico-institutional context factors in 19 central and eastern European countries.

Country	Electio n	Type of elector al system	Number of mandat es	Average district magnitu de	Nationwi de threshold (in %)	Legal thresho ld (in %)	Saliency of nationalis m	Reactio ns (ac.-ad.)	Special rules (1 = ye s)
Albania	2005	Mixed	140	12.14	1.68	2.5	10.9	0.88	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2006	PR	42	21	2.41	0	16.5	-1.65	0
Bulgaria	2005	PR	240	240	0.31	4	11.8	0.49	0
Czech Republic	2006	PR	200	14	1.32	5	13.1	-7.36	0
Estonia	2007	PR	101	9	2.24	5	11.2	-3.34	0
Croatia	2003	PR	140	14	1.52	5	14.2	-3.52	1
Hungary	2006	Mixed	386	4.81	1.44	5	14.2	-2.43	0
Kosovo	2004	PR	120	100	0.65	(0)	15.1	-24.00	1
Latvia	2006	PR	100	20	1.60	5	13.7	-5.97	0
Lithuania	2004	Mixed	141	35.26	1.03	5	10.1	2.62	0
Macedonia	2006	PR	120	20	1.46	0	12.0	-1.57	0
Moldova	2005	PR	101	101	0.74	6	13.2	11.43	0
Montenegro	2006	PR	81	37.50	1.38	3	15.1	0.35	0
Poland	2005	PR	460	11.20	0.96	(0)	11.8	0.44	0
Romania	2004	PR	332	328	0.23	5	14.9	-0.99	1
Serbia	2007	PR	250	250	0.30	(0)	15.1	0.00	0
Slovak Republic	2006	PR	150	150	0.50	5	13.4	-2.35	0

Country	Election	Type of electoral system	Number of mandates	Average district magnitude	Nationwide threshold (in %)	Legal threshold (in %)	Saliency of nationalism	Reactions (ac.-ad.)	Special rules (1 = yes)
Slovenia	2004	PR	90	11	2.19	0	11.3	-1.07	1
Ukraine	2006	PR	450	450	0.17	3	14.9	-0.77	0

Sources: Legal thresholds: OSCE Election Reports (<http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14207.html>); District magnitudes, assembly sizes, system type: [Tiemann, 2006], [Harfst, 2007] and [Shvetsova, 1999]; Saliency: Benoit and Laver (2006); Reactions: Klingemann et al. (2006), party manifestos of mainstream parties from Kosovo coded in line with the CMP scheme by experts contacted by the authors. *Note:* For the saliency of nationalism, the values of Serbia are assumed for Kosovo and Montenegro, likely underestimating the saliency in these states which are in the process of gaining independence. Legal thresholds of 0 are given in parentheses if they represent exceptions for minorities. For a description of special electoral rules for minorities see article text. In the “special rules”-variable, exceptions from legal thresholds are not considered. There are bans of ethnic parties in Albania and Bulgaria, coded as an additional dummy variable.

References

- A. Abedi
Challenges to established parties: the effects of party system features on the Electoral Fortunes of anti-Political-Establishment parties
European Journal of Political Research, 41 (4) (2002), pp. 551–583
- C.-C. Alionescu
Parliamentary representation of minorities in Romania
Southeast European Politics, 5 (1) (2004), pp. 60–75
- S. Alonso, R. Ruiz-Rufino
Political representation and ethnic conflict in new democracies
European Journal of Political Research, 46 (2) (2007), pp. 237–267
- K. Armingeon, R. Careja
Institutional change and stability in post-communist countries, 1990–2002
European Journal of Political Research, 47 (4) (2008), pp. 436–466
- D. Art
Reacting to the radical right: lessons from Germany and Austria
Party Politics, 13 (3) (2007), pp. 331–349
- K. Arzheimer
Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002
American Journal of Political Science, 53 (2) (2009), pp. 259–275

- K. Arzheimer, E. Carter
Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success
European Journal of Political Research, 45 (3) (2006), pp. 419–443
- S.A. Banducci, T. Donovan, J.A. Karp
Minority representation, empowerment, and participation
The Journal of Politics, 66 (2) (2004), pp. 534–556
- Z. Barany
Ethnic mobilization without prerequisites: the East European Gypsies
World Politics, 54 (3) (2002), pp. 277–307
- K. Benoit
The endogeneity problem in electoral studies: a critical re-examination of Duverger's mechanical effect
Electoral Studies, 21 (1) (2002), pp. 35–46
- K. Benoit, M. Laver
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
Routledge, London (2006)
- F. Bieber
National minorities in the party systems
V. Stojarová, P. Emerson (Eds.), *Party Politics in the Western Balkans*, Routledge, Abingdon (2010)
- K. Bird
The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: a comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11 (4) (2005), pp. 425–465
- J.K. Birnir
Ethnicity and Electoral Politics
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
- C.S. Bischoff
Measuring the Electoral Barrier: Problems and Solutions to Estimation of the Threshold(s) at the National Level
European University Institute, Florence (2004)
- C.S. Bischoff
National level electoral thresholds: problems and solutions
Electoral Studies, 28 (2) (2009), pp. 232–239
- D. Bochslers
The parliamentary elections in Serbia, 21 January 2007
Electoral Studies, 27 (1) (2008), pp. 160–165
- D. Bochslers
Regional party systems in Serbia
V. Stojarová, P. Emerson (Eds.), *Party Politics in the Western Balkans*, Routledge, Abingdon (2010), pp. 131–150

D. Bochsler

Electoral rules and the representation of ethnic minorities in post-communist democracies
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 7 (2010), pp. 153–180

D. Bochsler

It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them. Territorial determinants and institutional hurdles for the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries
Acta Politica, 46 (3) (2011), pp. 217–238

T. Brambor, W.R. Clark, M. Golder

Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses
Political Analysis, 14 (1) (2005), pp. 63–82

R. Brubaker

Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996)

N. Campos, V.S. Kuzeyev

On the dynamics of ethnic fractionalization
American Journal of Political Science, 51 (3) (2007), pp. 620–639

K. Chandra

What is an ethnic party
Party Politics, 17 (2) (2011), pp. 151–169

K. Chandra, S. Wilkinson

Measuring the effect of "Ethnicity"
Comparative Political Studies, 41 (4/5) (2008), pp. 515–563

F.S. Cohen

Proportional versus majoritarian ethnic conflict management in democracies
Comparative Political Studies, 30 (5) (1997), pp. 607–630

G.W. Cox

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997)

M. Duverger

Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State
Wiley, New York (1963)

P. Eisinger

Conditions of protest behaviour in American cities
American Political Science Review, 67 (1) (1973), pp. 11–28

G. Evans, S. Whitefield

Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe
British Journal of Political Science, 23 (4) (1993), pp. 521–548

J.D. Fearon

Ethnic and cultural diversity by country
Journal of Economic Growth, 8 (2) (2003), pp. 195–222

J.D. Fearon

Ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence

B.R. Weingast, D.A. Wittman (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006), pp. 852–868

B. Fowkes

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World

Palgrave, Basingstoke (2002)

M. Gallagher

Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems

Electoral Studies, 10 (1) (1991), pp. 33–51

M. Gallagher

Comparing proportional representation electoral systems: quotas, thresholds, paradoxes and majorities

British Journal of Political Science, 22 (4) (1992), pp. 469–496

M. Golder

Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in western Europe

Comparative Political Studies, 36 (4) (2003), pp. 432–466

T.R. Gurr

Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts

United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington (1993)

T.R. Gurr

Peoples Versus States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and Accommodation at the End of the Twentieth Century

United States Institute of Peace, Washington (2000)

H.E. Hale

The Foundations of Ethnic Politics. Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World

Cambridge University Press, New York (2008)

P.A. Hall, R.C.R. Taylor

Political science and the three new institutionalisms

Political Studies, 44 (5) (1996), pp. 936–957

Hansen, H, 2006.

Identity and Institutions: Explaining Ethnic Party Success in Eastern Europe. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 22–25 March 2006.

P. Harfst

Wahlsystemwandel in Mitteleuropa: Strategisches Design einer politischen Institution

VS, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden (2007)

R. Harmel, J.D. Robertson

Formation and success of new parties: a cross-national analysis

International Political Science Review, 6 (4) (1985), pp. 501–523

C. Hauss, D. Rayside

The development of new parties in western democracies since 1945

L. Maisel, J. Cooper (Eds.), *Political Parties: Development and Decay*, Sage, Beverly Hills (1978), pp. 31–54

J.J. Heckman

Sample selection bias as a specification error

Econometrica, 47 (1) (1979), pp. 153–161

D.L. Horowitz

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

University of California Press, Berkeley (1985)

S. Hug

Altering Party Systems. Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies

University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (2001)

S. Hug

Selection bias in comparative research: the case of incomplete data sets

Political Analysis, 11 (3) (2003), pp. 255–274

P. Ignazi

The Silent counter-revolution. hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe

European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1) (1992), pp. 3–34

J. Ishiyama, M. Breuning

Ethnopolitics in the New Europe

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (CO) (1998)

R. Jackman, K. Volpert

Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in western Europe

British Journal of Political Science, 26 (4) (1996), pp. 501–521

C.F. Juberías

Post-communist electoral systems and national minorities: a Dilemma in five paradigms

J.P. Stein (Ed.), *The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-communist Europe*, M.E.

Sharpe, Armonk (2000), pp. 31–64

G. King, R.O. Keohane, S. Verba

Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research

Princeton University Press, Princeton (1994)

H.P. Kitschelt

Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies

British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1) (1986), pp. 57–85

H.P. Kitschelt

Left-Libertarian parties: explaining innovation in competitive party systems

World Politics, 40 (2) (1988), pp. 194–234

H.P. Kitschelt
The Radical Right in Western Europe
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (1995)

H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, I. Budge, M. McDonald
Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003
Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)

T. Kostadinova
Do mixed electoral systems matter?: a cross-national analysis of their effects in Eastern Europe
Electoral Studies, 21 (1) (2002), pp. 23–34

T. Kostadinova
Ethnic and women's representation under mixed election systems
Electoral Studies, 26 (2) (2007), pp. 418–431

M. Levi, M. Hechter
A rational choice approach to the rise and decline of ethnoregional parties
E.A. Tiryakian, R. Rogowski (Eds.), New Nationalisms of the Developed West, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, Boston and London (1985), pp. 128–146

A. Lijphart
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration
Yale University Press, New Haven (1977)

A. Lijphart
Constitutional choice for new democracies
Journal of Democracy, 2 (1) (1991), pp. 72–84

S.M. Lipset, S. Rokkan
Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments. An introduction
S.M. Lipset, S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives, Free Press, New York (1967), pp. 1–64

J. Mansbridge
Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A Contingent 'Yes'
Journal of Politics, 61 (3) (1999), pp. 628–657

R. Mayntz, F.W. Scharpf
Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus
R. Mayntz, F.W. Scharpf (Eds.), Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung und politische Steuerung, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt/Main (1995), pp. 39–72

B.M. Meguid
Competition between unequals: the role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success
American Political Science Review, 99 (3) (2005), pp. 347–359

B.M. Meguid
Party Competition Between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2008)

F. Müller-Rommel

The greens in western Europe: similar but different

International Political Science Review, 6 (4) (1985), pp. 483–499

F. Müller-Rommel

Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa: Entwicklungsphasen und Erfolgsbedingungen

Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen (1993)

O. Amorim Neto, G.W. Cox

Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties

American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1) (1997), pp. 149–174

P. Norris

Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)

E.C. Norton, H. Wang, C. Ai

Computing interaction effects and standard errors in Logit and probit models

The Stata Journal, 4 (2) (2004), pp. 154–167

K.D. Opp

Gesellschaftliche Krisen, Gelegenheitsstrukturen oder rationales Handeln? Ein kritischer

Theorienvergleich von Erklärungen politischen Protests

Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 25 (3) (1996), pp. 223–242

P.C. Ordeshook, O.V. Shvetsova

Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties

American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1) (1994), pp. 100–123

A.D. Pantoja, G.M. Segura

Does ethnicity matter? Descriptive representation in legislatures and political alienation among Latinos

Social Science Quarterly, 84 (2) (2003), pp. 441–460

H.F. Pitkin

The Concept of Representation

University of California Press, Berkeley (1967)

R.R. Preuhs

The Conditional effects of minority descriptive representation: black legislators and policy influence in the American states

Journal of Politics, 68 (3) (2006), pp. 585–599

Rabe-Hesketh, S,

2002. Multilevel Selection Models Using GLLAMM. Presented at the Stata User Group Meeting. Maastricht.

A.R. Rabushka, K.A. Shepsle

Politics in Plural Societies. A Theory of Democratic Instability

Charles E. Merrill, Columbus (OH) (1972)

K. Redding, J.S. Viterna

Political demands, political opportunities: explaining the differential success of left-libertarian parties
Social Forces, 78 (2) (1999), pp. 491–510

R. Rice, D.L. Van Cott

The emergence and performance of indigenous people's parties in South America: a subnational statistical analysis
Comparative Political Studies, 39 (6) (2006), pp. 709–732

S.M. Saideman, D.J. Lanoue, M. Campenni, S. Stanton

Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic conflict: a pooled time series analysis, 1985–1998
Comparative Political Studies, 35 (1) (2002), pp. 103–129

F.W. Scharpf

Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
Westview Press, Boulder (1997)

G. Schneider, N. Wiesehomeier

Rules that matter. Political institutions and the polarization-conflict Nexus
Journal of Peace Research, 45 (2) (2008), pp. 183–203

P. Selb, S. Pituctin

Methodological issues in the study of new parties' entry and electoral success
Party Politics, 16 (2) (2010), pp. 147–170

O. Shvetsova

A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990–1998
Electoral Studies, 18 (3) (1999), pp. 397–409

M. Spirova

Political parties in Bulgaria: organizational trends in comparative perspective
Party Politics, 11 (5) (2005), pp. 601–622

S. Stroschein

Measuring ethnic party success in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine
Problems of Post-Communism, 48 (4) (2001), pp. 59–69

R. Taagepera

Nationwide threshold of representation
Electoral Studies, 21 (3) (2002), pp. 383–401

R. Taagepera

Making Social Sciences More Scientific. The Need for Predictive Models
Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008)

M. Tavits

Party system change: testing a model of new party entry
Party Politics, 12 (1) (2006), pp. 99–119

M. Tavits

Party systems in the making: the emergence and success of new parties in new democracies
British Journal of Political Science, 38 (1) (2007), pp. 113–133

G. Tiemann

Wahlsysteme, Parteiensysteme und politische Repräsentation in Osteuropa
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden (2006)

F. Tronconi

Ethnic identity and party competition. An analysis of the electoral performance of ethnoregionalist parties in western Europe
World Political Science Review, 2 (2) (2006), pp. 136–163

UNPD

Avoiding the Dependency Trap. The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe
UNDP, Bratislava (2003)

W. Van der Brug, M. Fennema, J. Tillie

Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: a two-step model of aggregate electoral support
Comparative Electoral Studies, 38 (5) (2005), pp. 537–573

F. Vella

Estimating models with sample selection bias: a survey
Journal of Human Resources, 33 (1) (1998), pp. 127–169

M. Weber

Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie
Mohr, Tübingen (2002)

J. Willey

Institutional arrangements and the success of new parties in old democracies
Political Studies, 46 (3) (1998), pp. 651–668

L. De Winter, H. Türsan (Eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, Routledge, London (1998)

T. Zarycki

Four dimensions of Center-Periphery conflict in the polish electoral geography
T. Klonowicz, G. Wieczorkowska (Eds.), Social Change. Adaptation and Resistance, Warsaw University Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw (2002), pp. 19–38